We empirically investigate dividend and share repurchase policies of Canadian firms. Our analysis contains two features that are uncommon in finance, while they are encountered in other fields of science. First, we use standard, simultaneous and nested logit models. By examining different model specifications, we test alternative descriptions of the behavior of decision-makers. Second, we use questionnaire data on firm characteristics. We have sent a questionnaire to the 500 largest nonfinancial Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, of which 191 usable responses were returned. Our results are consistent with a structure in which the company first decides whether it wants to pay out cash to its shareholders or not. In the second stage the firm decides on the form of the payout: dividends, share repurchases or both. Payout is determined by free cash flow. The choice for dividends and repurchases depends on behavioral and tax preferences. Furthermore, the payout is less likely to be dividends if the company has executive stock option plans. Finally, we find evidence for the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model. According to this model the existence of asymmetric information amongst outsiders is associated with a preference for dividend payments over share repurchases. 
Introduction
The most important strategic decisions that a financial manager has to take are the capital budgeting, the capital structure and the payout decisions. In this paper we analyze the payout decision. More specifically, we focus on the decision of the management whether to pay out cash, and if yes, in which form to pay out cash 5 . Most of the empirical literature on this decision focuses on the most common type of payout, i.e. a dividend. Even though the payment of cash dividends is a common practice for many companies, dividend payments remain a controversial topic in the academic corporate finance literature. The reason for this is that traditionally dividends were treated less favorably than capital gains in the United States. The fact that companies pay taxed dividends on one hand and attract new capital in the form of equity issues on the other hand is known as the dividend puzzle (see e.g. Black, 1976 ). An alternative for dividend payments is to buy back shares. Until now, most of the literature has looked at the dividend and the share buy-back decisions in isolation 6 . However, the dividend and the share buy-back decision are both consequences of the payout decision.
In this paper we study dividends and share buy-backs (SBBs) both in isolation and in combination with each other.
In this paper dividend and SBB policies are studied for Canadian firms. This country is of particular interest since it is the only other country in the world, next to the United States, where share repurchases often occur. These SBBs generally have the form of open market repurchases. 7 Another interesting aspect of the Canadian market is that a large number of firms do not pay dividends 8 . The combination of these two facts lead to an interesting sample that includes companies that only pay dividends, companies that are only engaged in SBBs, companies that are engaged in both and companies that do not pay out any funds.
Two empirical methods are introduced that are uncommon to finance, but have been used successfully in other fields of science. We show that borrowing methods from other fields allows different and, potentially, improved tests of theories. In our case the improvement is achieved in two ways. First, we estimate and compare several standard and non-standard logit models, which provide 5 Another type of "payout" is a dividend in the form of shares (a stock dividend). Since a stock dividend is materially the same as a small stock split, we only focus on payouts in the form of cash. 6 The only exception is the paper by Jagannathan et al. (2000) . They study companies from the United States that increase the total payment to their shareholders in the form of dividends, share buy-backs or both. Jagannathan et al. (2000) find evidence for their hypothesis that companies will only opt for dividends if the higher payout is permanent. more precise tests of the managerial decision-making process. The second improvement is the use of questionnaire data, which yields a richer data set than accounting and stock market data. The data give us the possibility to test, for example, agency and underpricing theories as perceived by the managers.
Accounting and stock market data are, in general, insufficiently informative in this respect.
We study three types of logit models. First, we use standard logit regressions in order to investigate the determinants of the choice between paying dividends or not, and buying back shares or not. Dividends and share repurchases are studied in isolation. Second, we employ a simultaneous logit model in which we test the same set of determinants, while we now allow for a potential tradeoff between dividends and share buy-backs. This second model allows dividends and share repurchases to influence each other. Our third type of logits are nested logit models. With these models we can test why managers choose to pay out or not, and, if they pay out, why they choose dividends, share buy-backs, or both. After the application of the three logit models, we compare the performance of the different models. By comparing these different models we can shed more light on the question whether the company sequentially decides on the payout question and on the form of the payout or whether the firm simultaneously decides on both the payout and on the form of the payout.
In addition, the determinants of the payout policies are researched.
Information on the payout policies, firm characteristics and shareholder structure is collected using a questionnaire. This questionnaire consists of simple questions without any explicit reference to the relations that we are interested in. The aim is to measure the explanatory variables in the model. In order to reduce the respondent's bias, we ask multiple questions for some variables and we use the average score. Using the data of the firm's characteristics we apply our logit regression techniques to determine the relationships. A major advantage of our questionnaire-based approach is that it allows us to use private data. It is important to notice that our approach differs from the approach used in other studies that use questionnaire data. Previous questionnaire studies on financial policies by, e.g., Jog and Srivastava (1994) and Graham and Harvey (2001) use questionnaires in order to directly ask questions about the theories. In contrast to these studies, we use questionnaires to obtain firm characteristics. The logit models are then used to test the different theories using these firm characteristics.
The questionnaire was sent to the 500 largest non-financial Canadian firms listed at the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). In total 191 usable responses were received (38.2%). We find that over the year 1997 41% of the firms paid dividends and that over the 3-year period preceding the questionnaire, 35% of the firms were engaged in at least one share buy-back. The most important results of the standard and simultaneous logit models are that dividend payments are significantly and positively related to the existence of tax and behavioral preferences. We hypothesize a negative relationship between dividend payments and managerial option plans. The reason for this is that dividends reduce the stock price and therefore the value of the options. In line with this hypothesis and with earlier research dividend payments are also significantly and negatively related to managerial option plans. We also find that SBBs are significantly positive related to free cash flow and the tax preference for SBBs. They are significantly negative related to the existence of asymmetric information amongst outsiders. Confirming these results, the two-stage logit model shows a significantly positive relation between free cash flow and payout. In the second stage of this model we find a significantly positive relation between dividends and tax and behavioral preferences and between SBB and the tax preferences. Furthermore, we find a negative relation between managerial option plans and dividend payments. This model also shows a strong confirmation of the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model. In this model shareholders are differently informed about the firm. Since it is assumed that the costs of collecting information are fixed, large shareholders will have a greater incentive to become informed about the firm's activities than small shareholders. For this reason, stock repurchases will be associated with a redistribution of wealth from small shareholders to large shareholders. Therefore the model predicts that the existence of asymmetric information between outsiders is associated with a preference for dividend payments over SBBs. This model is confirmed in our research in the sense that the existence of asymmetric information between outsiders is associated with a preference for dividend payments over SBBs. A comparison of model selection criteria shows that this third model, the two-stage logit model, is the preferred model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe theories that can explain the dividend and share buy-back policies of Canadian firms. In section 3 we discuss the empirical methodology of this paper. In section 4 we describe the data. The empirical results of our analysis are included in section 5. We provide a summary and conclusions in section 6.
Dividend and share buy-back theories

Introduction
There are three ways to look at dividend and share buy-back policies. These three ways can be translated into three different models. These models are presented in Figure 1 .
[Please Insert Figure 1 here] The first possibility is to consider both policies in isolation. Some theories explain dividend payments. Other theories explain share buy-backs. This possibility is translated into model I. In this model firms choose whether to pay dividends or not, independently from the SBB decision. They also choose whether to buy back shares or not, independently from the dividend decision. Hence, these two decisions are unrelated. The second possibility is that dividends and SBBs influence each other.
The idea is that if a company pays dividends it may decide not to buy back shares and vice versa. In model II we include this possibility. In this model it is investigated whether dividends and SBBs substitute each other. Of course, model I is encompassed by model II. The third possibility is that a company first decides whether it wants to pay back capital to its shareholders. After this decision is taken, the company decides on the method of payment. The payment can be a dividend payment, a share buy-back program or a combination of both. This possibility translates itself into model III where it is assumed that management first decides whether to pay out funds or not. If they decide to pay out, then in the second stage the type of payout is determined. Model III describes sequential decisions. The determinants of each of the two decisions are examined.
Below we will discuss the theories on dividend payments and SBBs. This will lead to the derivation of direct and indirect hypotheses. For this purpose, we first ask ourselves whether a variable induces a payout or not. If it induces a payout, there is a direct hypothesis between the variable and the payout decision. This leads to an indirect hypothesis between the different forms of payout (dividend and SBB) and this specific variable. It is also possible that the variable specifically induces a SBB. In that case a direct hypothesis exists between the variable and SBBs. This, in turn, leads to an indirect hypothesis between the variable and the payout decision.
Theories on dividends and share buy-backs
In their seminal paper Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect and complete capital market the dividend policy of a firm does not affect its value. The underlying idea is that the stockholder can replicate any desired stream of payments by purchasing and selling equity. The conclusion that dividend policy is irrelevant in perfect and complete capital markets directly leads to the question whether dividend policy is relevant if market imperfections exist and/or if markets are incomplete. A similar reasoning applies to share buy-backs. These are also irrelevant in perfect and complete capital markets, but they may be relevant if these conditions do not hold.
Free cash flow. Free cash flow is the cash flow that remains after all positive net present value projects are undertaken. The residual theory states that a firm will pay out its free cash flow to its shareholders. The direct hypothesis in our model is that the existence of free cash flow induces a payout. The indirect hypothesis is that the existence of free cash flow induces both dividends and share buy-backs. A confirmation of the free cash flow hypothesis would be in line with earlier empirical research by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000) for the United States and Li and McNally (2001) for Canada. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that US managers, who announce open market repurchase programs, are more likely to actively buy back shares if they have high expected and unexpected cash flows. Controlling for investment opportunities Dittmar (2000) finds that firms that have large amounts of cash and/or large amounts of cash flow are more likely to buy back shares. Li and McNally (2001) find that Canadian companies, that buy back shares, have more major shareholders and more free cash flow than companies that do not buy back shares.
Overinvestment. According to the overinvestment theory of Jensen (1986) managers aim for expanding their firm. The reason for this is that managers consider a large firm to be more prestigious than a small firm. They will pursue this goal even if they have to accept negative net present value projects. This is obviously not in the interest of the existing shareholders. Black (1976) argues that paying dividends can mitigate a potential overinvestment problem, because they reduce the amount of free cash flow. Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends reduce the overinvestment problem because the payment of dividends increases the frequency with which firms have to go to equity markets in order to raise additional capital. In the process of attracting new equity, firms subject themselves to the monitoring and disciplining of these markets. This lowers agency costs. A share buy-back also reduces the amount of free cash flow, suggesting that potential overinvestment also positively influences share buy-backs. Those firms that are more likely to overinvest should pay out more.
However, the managers of such firms will only pay out more if they have an incentive to do so.
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between overinvestment and payout if there is effective governance. Overinvestment also has an indirect relation with both dividends and share buy-backs.
These indirect relationships are hypothesized to be positive given effective monitoring and effective governance.
Managerial shareholdings.
Managers have a preference not to pay out funds, because they enjoy the discretion over free cash flow. If managers own more shares, they are in a better position to keep funds within the firm (see e.g. Eckbo and Verma, 1994) . For this reason we expect a negative relation between payout and managerial ownership. Therefore, the direct hypothesis is that the presence of managerial shareholdings prevents a payout. The indirect hypothesis is that the existence of managerial shareholdings prevents both dividends and share buy-backs.
Transaction costs on the company level.
If companies pay dividends and at the same time attract new equity, substantial transaction costs are being made. Of course, this argument also holds for share buy-backs. Therefore, we expect a direct negative relationship between payout and the amount of transaction costs that need to be made to attract new shares. This also leads to negative indirect relations between transaction costs and dividends and between transaction costs and SBBs. Transaction costs on the stockholder level. An investor who wants to receive a regular income from his security holdings has a choice between buying dividend paying stocks and cashing in the dividends, and buying non-dividend paying stocks and regularly selling a part of his portfolio.
For a small individual investor the transaction costs of cashing in dividends may be significantly smaller than the transaction costs associated with selling a part of the stocks 9 . For this reason, a company may have a transaction costs clientele that finds the payment of dividends important. We expect that this holds for firms with relatively many small private investors.
Asymmetric information between managers and outsiders. A major question is whether information asymmetries determine the dividend and SBB decisions. Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller 9 See e.g. Allen and Michaely (2002). and Rock (1985) argue, as pioneers, that information asymmetries between firms and outside shareholders may induce a signaling role for dividends. They show that dividend payments communicate private information in a fully revealing manner. The most important element in their theory is that firms have to pay out funds regularly. Therefore, a similar reasoning applies to recurrent SBBs. This leads to the direct hypothesis that a larger information asymmetry between managers and outsiders leads to a higher payout. The indirect hypothesis that follows is that a larger information asymmetry induces both higher dividends and more SBBs.
Asymmetric information amongst outsiders. Brennan and Thakor (1990) present a model in which shareholders are differently informed about the firm's activities. In their model there is a fixed cost of collecting information. Therefore, large shareholders will have a greater incentive to become informed about the firm's activities than small shareholders. The result is that stock repurchases will be associated with a redistribution of wealth from small shareholders to large shareholders. For this reason our direct hypothesis is that a majority of the firm's shareholders may prefer dividend payments to SBBs.
Managerial option plans.
Managerial option plans are generally not dividend protected (see e.g. Murphy (1998) ). This implies that dividends decrease the value of executive stock options 10 . Therefore, management has an incentive to reduce dividends in order to increase the expected value of their options. Lambert et al. (1989) study the dividend behavior of 221 US firms just after they adopted managerial stock option plans. Their results show that firms decrease the level of dividends, relative to the level of expected dividends, after the adoption of an executive stock option plan. Fenn and Liang (2001) also find a strong negative relationship between dividend payments and management stock options. Therefore, we hypothesize a negative relation between managerial option plans and dividends. On the other hand, we hypothesize a positive relation between managerial option plans and SBBs. The reason for this is that the announcements of SBBs are associated with an increase in stock prices. In turn, this leads to higher values of executive stock options (see Vermaelen, 1984) . This is also confirmed in a study by Dittmar (2000) who finds that firms with a large amount of shares outstanding held in reserve to cover their employee and management stock options are more likely to buy back shares.
Taxes
11 . Taxes are an important market imperfection. Canadian public corporations do not pay taxes on cash dividends received from the investment in another taxable Canadian firm.
However, if they receive capital gains from selling the stock, they are taxed at 75% of the firm's 10 We only refer to the decline of the stock price on the ex-dividend date for which the option holders are not compensated. It can, of course, not be excluded that dividend payments lead to a long-term increase in firm value, and therefore of the stock options. This possible effect is excluded in our analysis.
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The questionnaire was sent out in 1998. For this reason, the description of the Canadian tax system is based on the situation as it occurred in 1998. Later changes in the tax system are not incorporated in this paper.
marginal tax rate. In other words, dividends carry an important tax advantage for Canadian public corporations. The taxation of dividends received by Canadian individuals is organized in the following way (see e.g. Davis and Pinches, 1997 or Ross et al., 1999) . The dividends received from taxable Canadian corporations are first grossed up with 25% in order to arrive at the taxable dividend.
The outcome is taxed at the marginal federal income tax rate. Then a dividend tax credit of 13.33% is allowed to be deducted from the federal income tax in arriving at the net federal tax payable. Finally a provincial tax is added to the federal tax. If the individual would receive an income from capital gains instead of from dividends, he would be taxed for 75% of his marginal tax rate. A typical Canadian investor is normally better off with receiving dividends than with capital gains (see Davis and Pinches, 1997 and Ross et al., 1999) . However, it is important to notice that capital gains can be deferred to the future. If they are deferred far enough into the future, the present value of the capital gains taxes is relatively small. Finally, there is the case of non-Canadian shareholders, such as US holding companies and US private investors. As they don't receive the dividend tax credit, they are Behavioral finance. Shefrin and Statman (1984) develop a theory of dividends based on the idea that, even if the amount of cash received is the same, it can still make a difference for the investor whether the cash comes in the form of dividends, share repurchases, or in the form of selling part of the investors securities. Their model is not based on utility maximization, but on a behavioral theory. In their theory, investors want dividends because of self-control. This argument comes down to investors wanting to restrict themselves from consuming too much in the present. They do not want to dip into capital and, therefore, they only allow themselves to consume current income such as dividends. The effect described by Shefrin and Statman (1984) is especially strong for elderly (retired) investors, as they have less income from labor. For this reason they rely more heavily on income from their securities holdings. Shefrin and Statman (1984) refer to this as the behavioral life cycle. The direct hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between the behavioral preference for dividends and dividend payments.
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If the shares are not repurchased on the open market, the situation is more complex. If a Canadian investor is dealing at "arm's length" with the company, the sale is also treated as a capital gain. In other cases, Revenue Canada can treat the SBB as a combination of a "deemed dividend", a capital gain and an untaxed return of "paid-up capital".
The undervaluation of the firms shares. Ikenberry et al. (1995) argue that an important reason for managers to buy back shares is that their shares are undervalued. Managers consider their own stock as an attractive investment. For this reason, managers of undervalued firms may prefer a share buy-back over paying cash dividends and over no payout. This theory is confirmed in a number of empirical studies. Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 and Li and McNally (2001) find that announcements of SBBs in respectively the United States and Canada are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 have analyzed the long run performance of US and Canadian companies after SBBs
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. The authors suggest that the abnormal returns can be considered as evidence for the undervaluation theory.
A summary of the hypotheses
In this sub-section we summarize the theories on dividend payments and SBBs. We show how these theories fit in the different models that we test. The three alternative models that managers may use in the payout choice are included in Figure 1 (see sub-section 2.1). Based on the distinction between (un)related dividend and SBB decisions and the sequential payout and type of payout decisions, it is possible to attribute theories and hypotheses to the models. The hypotheses are presented in Table 1 .
[Please insert Table 1 here] As mentioned in sub-section 2.1, direct and indirect hypotheses are distinguished. For example, the existence of free cash flow is hypothesized to lead to a payout. Therefore, there is a direct hypothesis that free cash flow has a positive influence on payout. Because, the payout can either be in the form of a dividend or a SBB, there are also indirect hypotheses that the existence of free cash flow have a positive influence on both dividends and SBBs. The direct hypotheses are included in bold in Table   1 . Columns (2) and (3) reflect models I and II. These columns refer to respectively the dividend decision and the SBB decision. The negative sign for SBBs in column (2) indicates the hypothesized trade-off between the two forms of payout. The negative sign for managerial option plans reflects the hypothesized negative relation between the existence of managerial option plans and the probability of a dividend payment. In addition, the dividend choice is positively influenced by the transaction costs on the stockholder level, the perceived tax preference and the perceived behavioral preference.
Next to measuring the perceived tax and behavioral preferences, we have also asked for the actual existence of clienteles. For example, we asked for the presence of public corporations amongst the shareholders. If they are heavily presented, the firm has a tax clientele. Other clienteles included are the retired-persons clientele and the small-investor clientele. Their existence can be explained by 13 Lasfer (2000) also finds abnormal returns on the announcement date for the UK (1.64%) and the rest of Europe (1.06%). These returns are significant, but lower than in the US. He also finds a significantly positive long term abnormal performance in the UK. The rest of Europe, on the other hand, shows a negative long run abnormal performance.
behavioral finance and transactions costs effects, respectively. In column (3) we see that the direct determinants of SBBs are the trade-off with dividends, underpricing, managerial option plans and the tax preference for SBBs.
Model III is described in columns (4) and (5). First we describe in column (4) the theories that deal with the payout decision. In this column we include free cash flow, overinvestment, managerial shareholdings, transaction costs on the company level and asymmetric information between managers and outsiders. In column (5) we include the single hypothesis that directly refers to the type of payout, i.e. asymmetric information amongst outsiders.
In Table 1 also the indirect hypotheses are included (in parentheses). They are all derived from the direct hypotheses. For example, in panel A a direct hypothesis was presented between underpricing and the existence of a SBB (models I and II). As a SBB is one of the forms of payout, there is also an indirect hypothesis between underpricing and payout (model III). The reverse case applies to e.g. free cash flow. The sign in bold shows that the existence of free cash flow leads to a direct hypothesis for a payout (model III). This leads to an indirect hypothesis for either form of payout, i.e. a dividend or a SBB (models I and II). For this reason Table 1 includes two indirect hypotheses for the relation between free cash flow and dividend payment and SBB.
Methodology
Introduction
In order to test the theories discussed in section 2, we empirically examine the relevant determinants of payout policies. The empirical methodology should provide information about why managers pay dividends and why they buy back shares. In addition, the methodology should also provide insight into the sequential decision moments with respect to the payout decision. Two requirements are put on our methodology. First, the methodology must allow for different decision-making processes. It should be possible to test three structures, (i) unrelated decisions (i.e. dividend and buy back choice are not related), (ii) simultaneous decisions (i.e. dividend and buy back choices are mutually related), and (iii) sequential decisions (i.e. firms first decide on whether to pay out or not, and thereafter choose between dividends and share buy backs). We use three different logit models to capture these three decision-making processes. The second requirement is that the methodology must allow for a comparison of the predictive power of these three logit models. Below we discuss the three logit models and the model selection methods.
Logit analyses
We model the dividend and payout policy as two discrete choices for which we apply several logit models. With such models it can be examined why a firm pays out dividends or not, and why a firm buys back shares or not. The base case is a two-choice model for each decision. Using a single logit equation we estimate to which extent explanatory variables influence the probability that a firm chooses to pay dividends versus the choice for no dividends. A similar equation is tested for the share repurchase choice. The two decisions are modeled as unrelated decisions, assuming that the dividend and share buy-back decisions are two separate processes. The firm chooses to pay dividends independently of the current SBB policy and vice versa. This approach is used because firms first decide on the form of the payout and only in a later stage they decide on the amount of the payout. In this sense our approach is consistent with decision models for companies on the issuance of debt or equity.
14 In Appendix A.1 we explain the econometric model and the estimation procedure of single logit equations. It is interesting to note that the two standard single logit models also embody the case in which firms consider the repayment process as two processes with four outcomes, i.e. dividend, SBB, both dividend and SBB and no repayment. The estimation results from the multinomial logit model, which is typically used for this type of choice sets, are almost identical to running standard logit regressions on different pairs of outcomes.
In the two standard logit models we consider the dividend and SBB policy as separate decisions, which do not influence each other. In order to understand the way, in which the payout process operates, we should also consider the interactions between the dividend and SBB policies,
i.e. simultaneous decisions. In other words, we should examine the potential trade-off between dividends and SBBs. This suggests that the standard logit model should be extended by incorporating a dividend or share buy back variable in, respectively, the share buy back and dividend decision.
These adjustments change the model in a structural equations logit model, which is explained in Appendix A.2. This approach is novel to finance 15 .
The redistribution of capital to shareholders can also be seen as a process in which first a decision is made whether to pay out money to shareholders or not. The choices are sequential decisions. Correlations between dividends and SBBs can be due to variables that affect both policies. See e.g. Jung et al. (1996) . 15 In economics simultaneous logit models are already applied, see e.g. Stratmann (1992) .
also not commonly used in economics 16 . The model is based on utility theory and considers the attractiveness of the alternatives in a way that acknowledges similarities between the variables.
Strictly speaking, the nested logit model does not require that the actual process is a sequential process. The only requirement is that some variables affect groups of decisions. . It is important to take into account the number of parameters. When compared with parsimonious models, complex models, which include more parameters, will generally allow for more potential effects and will therefore generally have smaller modeling error, but larger estimation error. Comparison of the maximum likelihoods without a correction for model parsimony ignores this observation. The same can be concluded for methods that compare the predicted outcome with the actual outcome. Given similar maximum likelihoods or statistics that compare predicted with actual outcomes, we should prefer the more parsimonious model. The reason is that the imposed structure is not too tight compared to the more flexible complex model. Later we will see that our nested logit specification is a more parsimonious model than the multinomial and simultaneous logit model.
Hence, if similar maximum likelihoods or predictive power are obtained, then we should prefer the nested logit model.
Data description
Although theory provides us with numerous potential determinants, many of these firm characteristics are difficult to measure empirically. We employ questionnaire data to measure these determinants. A questionnaire is very useful since it allows us to use private information of the firm's 16 Such models can specifically be found in two areas, i.e. recreational economics and marketing. In recreational economics, for example, Morey et al. (1993) apply a nested logit model to the choices of a fisher in Atlantic salmon fishing. First, an individual decides to go fishing or not. Second, the fisher decides on the location. 17 See Morey (1997) for a thorough description of the application and estimation of nested logit models.
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See Stone (1979) for a discussion of the two criteria.
managers. Hence, the data allow us to test theories that cannot be tested with the use of publicly available information like accounting and stock market data 19 . For example, from section 2 it can be concluded that the perceived preferences of clienteles play a role. The extent to which managers perceive such a clientele to be present cannot be measured with the use of public data. Other topics that specifically call for the use of private data are asymmetric information related theories, e.g., the model of Brennan and Thakor (1990) and the impact of perceived underpricing of the firm's shares as suggested by Ikenberry et al. (1995) .
Our questionnaire design should avoid respondent's bias in two ways 20 . First, the question- firms with an SIC-code starting with a six (banks, insurance companies, offices of holding companies, brokers, real estate agencies, etc.). We aimed at having the questionnaires filled in by the CFOs of the firms. For this reason we addressed the questionnaire to the CFO if his or her name was included in the data set. In case we did not have the name of the CFO, we addressed the questionnaire to the CEO of the firm. The list of officers was used to select the CFO (or the CEO, Vice-president 19 Although this is not the case in finance, the use of questionnaire data is mainstream in the organization, sociology and psychology literature. For example, Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) use questionnaire data from venture capitalists regarding their relations with CEOs of firms in their portfolios. 20 Appendix B contains the questions of the questionnaire that are used in our analysis.
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Firm size was measured by market capitalization.
Finance, controller, treasurer, or a combination). The questionnaire was anonymous. 22 Respondents were promised a copy of the research report if they would fill in a separate form containing the name and the address of the respondent. We ensured anonymity by supplying separate return envelopes for the questionnaire and the form for the respondent's name, position, and address to obtain the results of the research. The questions deal with firm characteristics such as the presence of managerial option plans, asymmetric information, and the presence of specific clienteles amongst the shareholders. All questions could be answered on a scale from 1 to 7, or by indicating an answer on an alternative scale. The only exception on this rule were two questions in which we asked for respectively the Earnings Per Share and the Dividends Per Share, based on regular dividends, that the firm paid over the financial year 1997. The questionnaire was mailed to the 500 firms in May 1998, followed by a second mailing in June 1998 to improve the response rate and reduce potential nonresponse bias. The questionnaire yielded 191 usable responses (38.2%). This compares favorably with responses on other surveys. All returned surveys were received within a period of four months from the first mailing.
The results
In this section the empirical results are discussed. We first calculated the summary statistics. Because of space constraints we only present the results for the variable dividend paying and the variable SBB in the last three years. The variable dividend paying is a dummy variable based on the question whether the company has paid a dividend over the year 1997. This dummy is one if the company has paid a dividend over 1997 and zero otherwise. We find that 41% of the companies paid dividends and 59% of companies did not. We also asked whether the company has undertaken a SBB in the threeyear period preceding the questionnaire 23 . The SBB in the last three years variable shows that this was the case for 35% of the companies. Some of the explanatory variables in our study are measured by two or three questions. This applies for example to the asymmetric information amongst outsiders (questions 18 and 19) and the behavioral preference for dividends (questions 14, 15 and 16) variables. For such variables the average of the relevant questions was calculated. The summary statistics were then used in order to make univariate comparisons between the determinants and the 22 Advantages of using an anonymous questionnaire are a higher (expected) response rate and a higher possibility of receiving honest answers. A disadvantage is the fact that it is not possible to relate the results to other data on the firm such as accounting variables. 23 SBBs were measured over the 3-year period preceding the questionnaire. Dividends were only measured over 1997. However, the dividend policy of Canadian firms is very stable over time. From a study of Canadian companies over the period 1995-1997 we find that 97% of the firms that did not pay dividends in 1997 also did not pay dividends in 1995. [Please insert Table 2 here] The first column of Panel A in Table 2 provides the coefficients and the t-values of the regression in which dividend is explained. We find the expected significant negative relationship between dividend payments and transaction costs on the company level. This means that if transaction costs for companies to attract new equity capital are high, they pay less dividends. We also see that companies that have managerial option plans are less likely to pay dividends. This is also in line with our expectations, since most managerial option plans are not dividend protected. The significantly positively sign between dividends and the tax preference for dividends, indicates that there is a clientele that favors the management of the company to payout dividends for tax reasons. In section 2 we saw that, from a tax point of view, dividends are an attractive form of payout for Canadian companies and Canadian private persons. Finally, there is an expected significantly positively relationship between dividend payments and the behavioral preference for dividends. This means that the company has a clientele that wants the management to pay out dividends for behavioral reasons.
More importantly, it means that the management of the company adjusts its payout policy according to the desires of this clientele. Baker et al. (1985) also found the existence of different clienteles, including a tax clientele, in a questionnaire study.
The second column in Panel A of Table 2 provides the determinants of the share buy-back decision. We find the expected significantly negative sign for the variable asymmetric information amongst outsiders. We also find the expected significantly positively parameter estimate for free cash flow. This confirms the theory that if a firm has free cash flow, it is more likely to buy back its shares. This is also in line with previous empirical evidence by e.g. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) , Li and McNally (2001) and Dittmar (2000) . In addition, we find the expected significantly positively sign between share buy-backs and the tax preference for share buy-backs. A possible explanation for this is that some Canadian firms are dominated by US shareholders who have a preference for capital gains for tax reasons (see section 2). Besides that, the tax advantage for SBBs can also be based on the fact that in case of a SBB a party can decide itself whether to sell shares, and thus cash in capital gains, or not. This offers an advantage compared to dividend payments where shareholders do not have such a choice. Underpricing shows the expected positive coefficient. However, contrary to e.g. Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 we do not find a significant effect. There are some potential explanations for this difference in results. First, we only measure whether underpricing occurs for a 24 These results are, on request, available from the authors. longer period. It can be the case that companies want to profit from a short-term undervaluation. The second possibility is that a company has decided to buy back shares, for example because of the existence of free cash flow, and that it chooses the right moment to do so, i.e. when shares are undervalued. The third possibility is that the underpricing effect found in earlier studies can (partly) be explained as a free cash flow effect. For example, Nohel and Tarhan (1998) show that some of the results that are traditionally explained from underpricing can also be explained from free cash flow.
Contrary to our hypothesis, transaction costs on the company level shows a significantly positive sign. Table 2 contains the results of the multinomial model, which is mathematically identical to the single logit models (see section 3). The estimation gives similar results.
Panel B of
In Table 3 the results of the tests for Model II are included. In model II dividends and share buy-backs are assumed to influence each other. This model is tested by carrying out simultaneous logit regressions.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
The estimates for the coefficients dividend paying and share buy-back are not significant. This would indicate that the decisions do not influence each other. The remaining results in Table 3 are   comparable to the single equation logits in Panel A of Table 2 . Furthermore, it can be noticed that the signs of the coefficients do not change compared to model I in Table 2 . The magnitude of the tstatistics decreases in most cases. In this context it is interesting to notice that the transaction costs on the company level that showed an unexpected significantly positive coefficient in Table 2 is no longer significant. In general, the reduction of the t-statistics can be due to the fact that model II is less parsimonious than model I. This would indicate that model I gives a closer representation of the decision process than model II. Second, the more complex estimation method can be less efficient in finite samples.
In Table 4 the results for model III are included. Model III is the nested logit model in which the firm decides in the first stage whether to pay out and in the second stage on the form of the payout.
[Please insert Table 4 here] The first column in Table 4 is labeled "no payout" and it presents the determinants for the payout choice. These are the direct hypotheses for the payout decision that are included in panel A of Table   1 (model III in column (4)). Free cash flow has the expected significantly negative sign, indicating that the existence of free cash flow makes it less likely that the firm will not pay out funds. Column (2) presents the influence of the direct hypothesis on the payment of dividends (see the sign in bold in column (1) of Table 1 ). In addition we include the only variable that distinguishes between the type of payout, i.e. asymmetric information amongst outsiders. A significantly negative coefficient is found for managerial option plans. This means that the existence of an executive stock option plan makes it less likely that the firm pays dividends. This finding is consistent with an earlier empirical study for the United States by Lambert et al. (1989) that was discussed in sub-section 2.2. We find significantly positive results for the behavioral preference for dividends. This is in line with the Shefrin and Statman (1984) model. Furthermore, it can be noticed that there is a significantly positively result for the tax preference of dividends. Apparently, the tax clientele of the firm influences the choice for the type of payout. Table 4 also shows that the actual clienteles do not give significant results. In column (3) of Table 4 , the direct hypotheses on the existence of SBBs are presented (based on column (2) in panel A of Table 1 ). This column also includes asymmetric information amongst outsiders. First, we see that the choice for SBBs is influenced by the tax preference for SBBs. Asymmetric information amongst outsiders shows the expected negative sign in the third column. This result can be explained using the model of Brennan and Thakor (1990) . In this model, shareholders are differently informed about the firm's activities. The model assumes that there is a fixed cost for collecting information. This leads to a situation where large shareholders will have a greater incentive to become informed about the firm's activities than small shareholders.
Consequently, SBBs are associated with a redistribution of wealth from small to large shareholders.
The reason for this is that large shareholders know in which SBBs to participate and small shareholders do not. In Table 4 we find that if there is a large information asymmetry amongst shareholders, firms are more likely to pay dividends than to buy back shares 2526 . This is consistent with the model of Brennan and Thakor (1990) .
In Table 5 the fit of the models is compared.
[Please insert Table 5 here] Table 5 can be read as follows. If we first look at the results of the separate logit models (model I) in panel A, we see that in total 45 companies only paid dividends. The separate logit models correctly predict 27 of these companies (60%). In four cases the model incorrectly predicts that the company both pays dividends and carries out a SBB, while actually only dividend was paid. Also, in 14 cases the model incorrectly predicts that the company will not pay out at all. The numbers on the diagonals are the correct predictions. It can be seen that the separate logit model especially does a good job in predicting companies that only pay dividends and companies that do not pay out at all. The sum of the diagonals is 98, indicating that 56% of the observations are correctly predicted. Note that without Table 5 shows that for both measures the nested logit model is the preferred model. The nested logit model imposes much more structure on the problem in terms of less parameters, which is not translated into a lower value of the likelihood function. This is remarkable. In short, our analysis shows that the nested logit model is the preferred model to explain dividend and SBB policies.
Conclusion
In this paper we have tested three models for dividend and share buy-back (SBB) policies. In the first model dividends and SBBs are studied in isolation. In the second model dividends and SBBs influence each other. The third model assumes that a firm first decides whether it wants to pay out cash to its shareholders or not. After this decision is taken, the company decides on the form of the payout: dividends, SBBs or both. The methodology that we use consists of two steps: in the first step we measure firm variables. In the second step we measure the relationships between the variables. The variables were collected using a questionnaire, which was sent to the 500 largest non-financial companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
We find strong empirical evidence for the third model in which the company first decides on the payout question and then on the form of the payout. The payout decision is driven by the existence of free cash flow. The choice for dividend as payout is caused by factors such as tax and behavioral preferences. The choice for SBBs is driven by tax preferences. We also find evidence that the payout for firms with managerial option plans is less likely to be dividends. Finally, our analysis shows a strong confirmation for the Brennan and Thakor (1990) model. This model states that the existence of asymmetric information amongst outsiders is associated with a preference for dividends over SBBs. The table includes the hypotheses that are tested in the paper. Direct positive "+" and negative "-" relations are indicated in bold. Indirect relations are in parentheses. Dividends are indicated as "d", share buy-backs as "s" and dividends and share buy-backs together as "b" (both). If the occurrence of the two methods of payments is equally likely, it is indicated as "=". If one method of payment is more likely than another, it is indicated as ">", respectively as "<". , respectively. The standard logit model assumes that the error terms are independently and identically Gumbel distributed. Given this assumption, it can be derived that the probability P i that a firm i chooses for the payment of dividends is:
The probability P i (ND) equals 1− P i (D) . Estimates for b k D and inference can be obtained by standard maximum likelihood methods. As stated before, in a similar way probabilities derived for P i (S) and 1− P i (NS).
B.2. Structural logit equation model
In a structural logit equation model, the standard logit model is extended by incorporating a dividend or share buy back variable in the systematic parts of the two utility functions. Therefore, the utility of dividend payout depends on SBB, and the utility of SBB depends on the dividend payout. The structural-form representation of this model is given by, 
where U iD and U iS are the unobserved utilities obtained from dividend payment and share buy-back by firm i. The γ D and γ S are parameters and the β D and β S are vectors of parameters as before. Exogenous variables are contained in x iD and x iS . The error terms are denoted by e iD and e iS . The firm knows these error terms, the researcher does not. We only observe whether U iD and U iS are above particular thresholds since we only observe whether the firms pays dividends or not and buys back shares or not. Mallar (1977) examines simultaneous logit equations and shows the relationship between the probability that an event occurs, and the structural-form representation. He argues that a two-stage estimator is appropriate to estimate the system using standard techniques for models with dichotomous variables. In the first stage the parameters of the reduced-form representation of (4) are estimated. The estimated parameters are used to obtain consistent estimates U * iD and U * iS for U iD and U iS in the right-hand side of (4). In the second stage, after substitution of the estimates U * iD and U * iS for U iD and U iS in the right-hand side of (4), the structural-equations representation is estimated. If we assume that e iD and e iS follow the Gumbel distribution then standard logit estimators can be used in stage one and two. Note that in stage two the probabilities are similar as in (3), and its analog for the share buy back decision, using, 
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The exact specification of the asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimate is difficult to obtain due to the presence of generated regressors in the second stage, i.e. U iD and U iS (see Nelson and Olson, 1978) . This distribution is important for the tests of the statistical significance of the parameter estimates. Amemiya (1979) derives the asymptotic distribution and shows that it depends on the unknown parameters γ D and γ S and nuisance parameters. We apply the bootstrap method to obtain the distribution of the parameter estimates. Besides simplicity, the advantage of the procedure is that the findings hold for our finite sample. Our bootstrap method draws the error terms in (4) from the Gumbel distribution. In total we obtain 10,000 bootstrap parameter estimates from which we can make inference on the standard errors of our parameter estimates (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) .
B.3. Nested logit model
Let PN and PY denote the first choice of not paying and paying, respectively. The second choice is described by S, D, and DS which denote only share buy-back, only dividend payment and the simultaneous use of both instruments, respectively. Consequently, the choice set is, C={(PN), (PY,S) , (PY,D) , (PY,DS)}. The nested logit model that describes the choice set C has several underlying assumptions, which will be discussed briefly. In addition, we summarize several general properties of the model. The first important underlying assumption is that the attractiveness of choice c in C is described by utility functions, 
PY
where I∈{S, D, DS}, v iPN , v iPY and v iI are the systematic components of the utility function related to pay out and instrument choice, and e iPN , e iPY and e iI are the error terms of the utility functions. The firms know these error components, the researcher does not. Note that the error components of the utility functions for different I are correlated, which is not the case in the standard logit and multinomial models. Using Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) The next step is to determine the specification of the systematic components in the utility function. As above, we assume that linear specifications are appropriate, i.e. 
where a k , b k and c Ik are parameters and x ik PN , x ik PY and x ik I are explanatory variables.
